Stiglitz on the Economics of Information

The Economics of Information

Information, The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics, David R. Henderson (ed.), Warner Books, 1993, pp. 16-21.
Symposium on the Economics of Information: Introduction, Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), October 1977, pp. 389-391.

Information and Economic Analysis

Information and Economic Analysis, in Current Economic Problems, J.M. Parkin and A.R. Nobay (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-52. (Proceedings of the Association of University Teachers of Economics, Manchester, England, April 1974.)
Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective, Economic Journal, 95, Supplement: Conference Papers, 1985, pp. 21-41.
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), November 2000, pp. 1441-78.
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, in Les Prix Nobel; The Nobel Prizes 2001, Tore Frangsmyr (ed.), The Nobel Foundation, 2002, pp. 472-540. Also published in Revista Asturiana De Economia, 25, December, 2002, pp.95-164.
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, abbreviated version of Nobel lecture, American Economic Review, 92(3), June 2002, pp. 460-501.
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Part One, in The American Economist, Volume 47, 2003, pp. 6-26.
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Part Two, in The American Economist, Vol. 48, Spring 2004, pp.17-50.

The Theory of Screening

The Theory of Screening, Education and the Distribution of Income, American Economic Review, 65(3), June 1975, pp. 283-300.
A Model of Employment Outcomes Illustrating the Effect of the Structure of Information on the Level and Distribution of Income, with M. Rothschild, Economic Letters, 10, 1982, pp. 231-236.
Information, Screening and Welfare, in Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Marcel Boyer and Richard Khilstrom (eds.), Elsevier Science Publications, 1984, pp. 209-239.

Theory of Self-Selection

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, with M. Rothschild, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), November 1976, pp. 629-649. Subsequently reprinted in Industrial Economics, O.E. Williamson (ed.), Edward Elgar, 1990, pp. 141-61; in Foundations of Insurance Economics, G. Dionne and S. Harrington (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992; and in Economic Theory and the Welfare State, Nicholas Barr (ed.), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000.
Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later, with Michael Rothschild, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 22(2), December 1997, pages 73-79.
Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market, Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), October 1977, pp. 407-430.
Prices and Queues as Screening Devices in Competitive Markets, in Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn, D. Gale and O. Hart (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992, pp. 128-166. Also IMSSS Technical Report No. 212, Stanford University, August 1976.

Theory of Adverse Selection, Efficiency Wages, and Credit Rationing

Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, with A. Weiss, American Economic Review, 71(3), June 1981, pp. 393-410. Subsequently reprinted in New Keynesian Economics, 2, G. Mankiw and D. Romer (eds.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991 pp. 247-276. Also Princeton University Econometric Research Program Research Memoranda 267 and 268. (Presented at a meeting of the Western Economic Association, June 1978), subsequently reprinted in Foundations of the Law, Barry Adler (ed.), Foundation Press, 2003.
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, with Carl Shapiro, American Economic Review, 74(3), June 1984, pp. 433-444. Subsequently reprinted in New Keynesian Economics, 2, N.G. Mankiw and D. Romer (eds.), MIT Press, 1991, pp. 123-142. Also in Macroeconomics and Imperfect Competition, Jean-Pascal Bénassy (ed.), Edward Elgar Publisihing, 1995, pp. 453-464.
The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Prices, Journal of Economic Literature, 25, March 1987, pp. 1-48. Subsequently reprinted in Impresa, Instituzione e Informazione, M. Franzini and M. Messori (eds.), Bologna: Cooperative Libraria Universitaria, 1991.
Credit Rationing: Reply, with A. Weiss, American Economic Review, 77(1), March 1987, pp. 228-231.
Can Unemployment be Involuntary? Reply, with C. Shapiro, American Economic Review, 75(5), December 1985, pp. 1215-1217.
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device: Reply, with C. Shapiro, American Economic Review, 75(4), September 1985, pp. 892-893.

Theory of Incentives and Economic Organization

Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, Review of Economic Studies, 41(2), April 1974, pp. 219-255.
Sharecropping: Risk Sharing and the Importance of Imperfect Information, with D. Newbery, in Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development, J.A. Roumasset, et al. (eds.), Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA) and Agricultural Development Council, 1979, pp. 311-341. (Originally presented at a conference in Mexico City, March 1976.)
Information, Competition and Markets, with B. Nalebuff, American Economic Review, 73(2), May 1983, pp. 278-284.
Human Fallibility and Economic Organization, with R. Sah, American Economic Review, 75(2), May 1985, pp. 292-296.

Information and Prices

The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard, with R. Arnott, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 90(3), 1988, pp. 383-413. Also NBER Working Paper 2484.
Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, Journal of Money, Banking, and Credit, 17(2), May 1985, pp. 133-152. Subsequently reprinted in La Theoria del Mercata Finanziari, G. Viciago and G.Verga (eds.), Bologna: Societa Editrice il Mulino, 1992.
Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets, World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), September 1990, pp. 351-366. Also in The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy, World Bank, 1993, pp. 70-86.
Information and Competitive Price Systems, with S. Grossman, American Economic Review, 66(2), May 1976, pp. 246-253.
Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersions, with S. Salop, Review of Economic Studies, 44(3), October 1977, pp. 493-510. Reprinted in The Economics of Information, S.A. Lippman and D.K. Levine (eds.), Edward Elgar, 1995, pp. 198-215.
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, with S. Grossman, American Economic Review, 70(3), June 1980, pp. 393-408. Subsequently reprinted in Financial Markets and Incomplete Information - Frontiers of Modern Financial Theory, 2, S. Bhattacharya and G. Constantinides (eds.), Rowman and Littlefield, 1989, pp. 123-136.

Valuing Information

A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information, with R. Radner, in Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Marcel Boyer and Richard Khilstrom (eds.), Elsevier Science Publications, 1984, pp. 33-52.

Welfare Economics of Information

Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, with B. Greenwald, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 2, May 1986, pp. 229-264. Reprinted in Economic Theory and the Welfare State, Nicholas Barr (ed.), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000. Originally entitled “Pecuniary and Market Mediated Externalities: Toward a General Theory of the Welfare Economics of Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets,” NBER Working Paper 1304.

Information and Macro-Economics

Informational Imperfections in the Capital Markets and Macroeconomic Fluctuations, with A. Weiss and B. Greenwald, American Economic Review, 74(2), May 1984, pp. 194-199.
Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles, with B. Greenwald, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1), February 1993, pp. 77-114. Also NBER Working Paper 2494. (Paper prepared for the Far-Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society, Seoul, June 1991.)
Alternative Approaches to the Analysis of Markets with Asymmetric Information: Reply, with A. Weiss, American Economic Review, 73(1), March 1983, pp. 246-249.

Information and Capital Markets

Information and Capital Markets, in Financial Economics: Essays in Honor of Paul Cootner, William F. Sharpe and Cathryn Cootner (eds.), Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 118-158. Also NBER Working Paper 678.
The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale, Journal of Finance, 44(2), June 1989, pp. 469-478. Also NBER Working Paper 3259.
Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald, Industrial and Corporate Change, 1(1), 1992, pp. 37-63. Also in Finance and the Enterprise, V. Zamagni (ed.), Academic Press, 1992, pp. 11-36.
Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss, American Economic Review, 73(5), December 1983, pp. 912-927.
Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss, in Recent Developments in Corporate Finance, Jeremy Edwards, et al. (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 101-135. Also a Bell Communications Research Discussion Paper.
Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. Hellmann, in European Economic Review, 44(2), February 2000, pp. 281-304. Earlier, longer version in “A Unifying Theory of Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection,” Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper 1356, October 1995.
Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss, Greek Economic Review, 12, Supplement, Autumn 1990, pp. 85-118. Reprinted in Financial Intermediaries, Mervin K. Lewis (ed.), Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1995, pp. 297-330. Also NBER Working Paper 2710, September 1988.
Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment, in The Economics of Cooperation: East Asian Development and the Case for Pro-Market Intervention, J.A. Roumasset and S. Barr (eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, pp. 15-38. (Presented at Investment Coordination in the Pacific Century: Lessons from Theory and Practice Conference, given at the University of Hawaii, January 1990.)
Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, Journal of Financial Services Research, 3(2/3), December 1989, pp. 101-115.
Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz, European Economic Review, 30(3), June 1986, pp. 481-513. Reprinted in Development Economics, 4, D. Lal (ed.), Elgar, 1992, pp. 241-273. Also NBER Working Paper No. 1864, April 1986 and NBER Reprint 793.
Credit Rationing, with D. Jaffee, in Handbook of Monetary Economics, B. Friedman and F. Hahn (eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1990, pp. 837-888.
Pareto Optimality and Competition, Journal of Finance, 36(2), May 1981, pp. 235-251.

Information and Labor Markets and the General Theory of Incentives

Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy, Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), Autumn 1975, pp. 552-579. (Presented at Berlin Symposium on Planning, August 1973.)
Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff, Bell Journal, 14(1), Spring 1983, pp. 21-43. Also Princeton University Econometric Research Program Research Memorandum 293.
Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing, in Incentives, Cooperation and Risk Sharing, H. Nalbantian (ed.), Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1987, pp. 47-68.
Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, Geneva Papers, 8(26), January 1983, pp. 4-32. Also Princeton University Financial Research Center Memorandum 42. (Fifth Annual Geneva Lecture delivered at Zurich, March 1981.)
Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.’s: The Labor Turnover Model, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(2), May 1974, pp. 194-227. Subsequently published in Development Economics, 1, D. Lal (ed.), Elgar, 1992, pp. 288-321.
The Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, Surplus Labor and the Distribution of Income in L.D.C.’s , Oxford Economic Papers, 28(2), July 1976, pp. 185-207.
Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model, in The Theory and Experience of Economic Development: Essays in Honor of Sir Arthur W. Lewis, M. Gersovitz, et al. (eds.), London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp. 78-106.
Equilibrium Wage Distributions, Economic Journal, 95(379), September 1985, pp. 595-618.
Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. Arnott, Journal of Labor Economics, 3(4), October 1985, pp. 434-462.
The Wage- Productivitiy Hypothesis: Its Economic Consequences and Policy Implications, in Modern Developments in Public Finance, Michael J. Boskin ed., Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 130-165.
Principal and Agent, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, MacMillan Press, 1987. Subsequently reprinted in The New Palgrave: Economic Development, J. Eatwell, et al. (eds.), Macmillan, 1989.

Information and Product Markets

Imperfect Information in the Product Market, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989, pp. 769-847.
The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop, American Economic Review, 72(5), December 1982, pp. 1121-1130. Also Princeton University Econometric Research Program Research Memorandum 283.
Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information,” American Economic Review, 69(2), May 1979, pp. 339-345.

Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets? Journal of Political Economy, 95(5), 1987, pp. 1041-1061. (Revised version of “Duopolies are More Competitive than Atomistic Markets,” Princeton University Econometric Research Program Research Memorandum 310, February 1984.)
On Search and Equilibrium Price Distributions, in Economics and Human Welfare: Essays in Honor of Tibor Scitovsky, M. Boskin (ed.), York: Academic Press Inc., 1979, pp. 203-236.
Information, Welfare and Product Diversity, with S. Salop, in Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, G. Feiwel (ed.), London: MacMillan, 1987, pp. 328-340. (Revised version of a paper presented to a conference on imperfect information at Bell Labs, February 1978.)

Information and Development

Economic Organization, Information, and Development, in Handbook of Development Economics, H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.), Elsevier Science Publishers, 1988, pp. 185-201.
Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets, with A. Braverman, American Economic Review, 72(4), September 1982, pp. 695-715. Also Princeton University Econometric Research Program Research Memorandum 299.
Landlords, Tenants and Technological Innovations, with A. Braverman, in Journal of Development Economics, 23(2), October 1986, pp. 313-332.
Cost Sharing Arrangement Under Sharecropping: Moral Hazard, Incentive Flexibility and Risk, with A. Braverman, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(3), August 1986, pp. 642-652. (Revised version of “Moral Hazard, Incentive Flexibility & Risk: Cost Sharing Arrangements under Sharecropping,” with A. Braveman, Economic Research Program, Research Memorandum 298, Princeton, 1988.)
Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity and the Dynamics of Inequality, with A. Braverman, in P. Bardhan (ed.), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, pp. 185-201. Previously World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 176, May 1989; also Princeton University Discussion Paper 23, 1988.
Moneylenders and Bankers: Price-increasing Subsidies in a Monopolistically Competitive Market, with Karla Hoff, Journal of Development Economics, 52, 1997, pp. 429-462. Corrected for printing errors in “Moneylenders and Bankers: Price-Increasing Subsidies with Monopolistic Competition,” Journal of Development Economics, 55, 1998, pp. 485-518. Previously “Theory of Imperfect Competition in Rural Credit Markets,” Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper IPR 49, 1992; and “Moneylenders and Bankers: Fragmented Credit Markets with Monopolistic Competition,” Working Paper 93-10, University of Maryland, Department of Economics, 1993.
Sharecropping, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, MacMillan Press, 1987. Subsequently reprinted in The New Palgrave: Economic Development, J. Eatwell, et al. (eds.), Macmillan, 1989, pp. 308-315.
Economics of Information and the Theory of Economic Development, Revista De Econometria, 5(1), April 1985, pp. 5-32.
Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets: Puzzles and Policy Perspectives, with K. Hoff, World Bank Economic Review, 4(3), September 1990, pp. 235-250. Subsequently revised and reprinted in The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy, K. Hoff, A. Braverman, and J. Stiglitz (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993, pp. 33-52.
Consequences of Limited Risk Markets and Imperfect Information for the Design of Taxes and Transfers: An Overview, in The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy, K. Hoff, A. Braverman, and J. Stiglitz (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1993, pp. 33-49.

Information and Economic Organization

The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, with R. Sah, American Economic Review, 76(4), September 1986, pp. 716-727. Also a shortened version in AEA Papers and Proceedings, also published in Personnel Economics, Edward P. Lasear and Robert NcNabb (eds.) 2002.
Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, with R. Sah, The Economic Journal, 98(391), June 1988, pp. 451-470.
Qualitative Properties of Profit-Maximizing K-out-of-N Systems Subject to Two Kinds of Failure, with R. Sah, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 37(5), December 1988, pp. 515-520.
The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, with R. Sah, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1), February 1991, pp. 289-25. Also Yale University Economic Growth center Discussion Paper 624, April 1990.
Symposium on Organizations and Economics, Journal of Economic Perspective, 5(2), Spring 1991, pp. 15-24.
Market Socialism and Neoclassical Economics, in Market Socialism: The Current Debate, P. Bardhan and J. Roemer (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 21-41.